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Abstract In this paper, we present a novel encryption-
less algorithm to enhance security in transmission of data
in networks. The algorithm uses an intuitively simple
idea of a jigsaw puzzle to break the transformed
data into multiple parts where these parts form the
pieces of the puzzle. Then these parts are packaged
into packets and sent to the receiver. A secure and
efcient mechanism is provided to convey the information
that is necessary for obtaining the original data at the
receiver-end from its parts in the packets, that is, for
solving the jigsaw puzzle. The algorithm is designed
to provide information-theoretic (that is, unconditional)
security by the use of a one-time pad like scheme so
that no intermediate or unintended node can obtain the
entire data. An authentication code is also used to ensure
authenticity of every packet.
Keywords- Data protection, Information theory, Secu-
rity algorithm, Key management, One-time pad
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of network communications is arguably the
most important issue in the world today given the vast
amount of valuable information that is passed around
in various networks. Information pertaining to banks,
credit cards, personal details, and government policies
are transferred from place to place with the help of
networking infrastructure. The high connectivity of the
World Wide Web (WWW) has left the world “open”.
Such openness has resulted in various networks being
subjected to multifarious attacks from vastly disparate
sources, many of which are anonymous and yet to be
discovered. This growth of the WWW coupled with
progress in the fields of e-commerce and the like has
made the security issue even more important.
A typical method for security that is used to pre-
vent data from falling into wrong hands is encryption.
Some encryption techniques like RSA ([13]) which use
asymmetric keys, involve algebraic multiplications with
very large numbers. The cost that has to be paid in
implementing encryption in networks is high owing to
this computational complexity. While other techniques
like the DES ([12]) which use symmetric keys are less
secure computationally than their asymmetric counter-
parts. Given the amount of computing power that is
available, and considering also the growth of distributed
computing, it is possible to break into the security offered
by many such existing algorithms. So, any alternative to
encryption is welcome so long as the level of security is
the same or higher. Also, such an alternative should be
more efficient in its usage of resources.
In practice, in a computer network, data is transferred
across nodes in the form of packets of fixed size. Any
form of security required is obtained by implementing
cryptographic algorithms at the application level on the
data as a whole. Then, the enciphered data is packe-
tized at lower levels (in the OSI model) and sent. Any
intruder able to obtain all the packets can then obtain
the enciphered data by appropriately ordering the data
content of each of these packets. Then, efforts can be
made to break the cryptographic algorithm used by the
sender. In the process of transmission, if it is possible to
prevent any information release as to the structure of the
data within the packets, an intruder would know neither
the nature of the data being transferred nor the ordering
of the content from different packets. This is what our
algorithm achieves by using a one-time pad like scheme
at the source.
The essential idea in our algorithm is to break the
data that is to be transferred into many chunks, which
we call “parts”. These parts when put together form the
whole data but only if done so in a particular way, just
like in a “jigsaw” puzzle. The only way of doing so is
known to the receiver for whom the data is intended. Any
unauthorized node does not have enough information to
carry out the right method of obtaining the parts from
the packets and joining them, and then knowing it is
correct (which is the property of the one-time pad). We
have incorporated efficient techniques that enhance the
security of the scheme, and at the same time implement
the desired features. The concept on which our algorithm
hinges heavily is that of the one-time pad. It was first
proposed by Vernam in [1]. A formal proof of the
perfect-secrecy property of the one-time pad was later
provided by Shannon in [2]. As can be seen from the
reference, the one-time pad offers unconditional security
as against conditional or computational security of all
encryption algorithms currently known.
II. RELATED WORK
Owing to several issues mostly pertaining to key man-
agement, the theoretical one-time pad has been tough
to implement practically. Numerous attempts have been
made but under varying assumptions and conditions. One
of the most recent has been [4] where one-time pads are
used to protect credit card usage on the Internet. In [5],
it has been argued that unconditional security can be
obtained in practice using non-information -theoretically
secure methods. This approach maintains that in the
practical world, nobody can obtain complete information
about a system owing to real-world parameters like
noise. Likewise, [6], [7] and [8] provide implementations
of one-time pads and unconditional security but under
assumptions about the environment and/or adversary.
[9] provides a quantum cryptographic view of one-time
pads.Technological and practical limitations constrict the
scalability of such methods! . Chaotic maps are used to
generate random numbers in [10], and these are used
to build symmetric encryption schemes including one-
time pads. Chaos theoretical methods though providing
non-traditional methods of random number generation,
are prone to cryptanalysis owing to the still-existent
pseudorandom nature, and impose numerous restrictions
on data size as is the case with [10].
In this paper, we provide an efficient implementation
of the one-time pad without making assumptions or
imposing restrictions, the likes of which are true of
the references quoted in the previous paragraph. In the
process, the core issues including key management are
addressed and dealt with effectively. Due to its general
nature, our algorithm can be deployed in most real-life
networks without a fundamental change in the idea.
III. THE ALGORITHM
In this algorithm, we use the concept of Message
Authentication Code (MAC) as suggested in [3] to
authenticate messages. For a packet of data, the MAC is
calculated as a function of the data contents, the packet
sequence number and a secret key known only to the
sender and the receiver, and then it is appended to the
packet. On receiving a packet, the receiver first computes
the MAC using the appropriate parameters, and then
performs a check with the MAC attached to the packet.
If there is no match, then the receiver knows that the
packet has been tampered with. For a detailed analysis,
the reader is referred to [3].
Let the size of a packet in a network be denoted as PS.
PS has a value of 1024-bits or 4096-bits typically. The
prerequisite of the algorithm is the knowledge for the
sender and the receiver only of a number P, exchanged
a priori, of size k*PS, where k is a natural number. We
can consider P in terms of blocks of size PS each, as
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. Thus P is the number obtained by the
concatenation of the
 
blocks for i from 1 to k, that is,
P is
  	
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In this algorithm, we only consider k-1 parts of a data
at a time, where each part is of any size less than or equal
PS-2 (a detailed analysis of the algorithm is presented
in the next section). If the entire data is not covered
in these k-1 parts, then the algorithm can be repeated by
considering the next k-1 parts and so on. Also, a random
number of size PS is required to be generated for every
k-1 blocks processed. Denote this random number as R.
The steps at the sender’s end of the algorithm are as
follows:
S(D)
1) ”Tear the data D into N parts arbitrarily”.
Consider the first k-1 parts of D. Call them
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. Prefix and suffix each part by
the binary digit ’1’.
2) Perform the operation 
 

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i from 1 to k-1.
Denote them as
fiff

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3) Form
 ff
 as
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4) Perform transform(P,R).
5) Generate a new random number and assign it to
R.
6) Repeat steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 for the next k-1 blocks
of data, and so on until all N parts are processed.
Now the packets actually transferred are formed from
the
flff
 blocks, packet sequence number and the MAC
(calculated as described earlier).
At the receiver’s end, the steps are as follows:
R(D’)
1) Perform a check on the MAC for each packet. If
satisfied, GOTO next step.
2) Order packets according to the packet sequence
number.
3) For each group of k packets perform the following:
- Perform
 

flff


i from 1 to k-1
- Perform
 


ff
 and obtain R.
- Remove the leading and trailing ’1’ of all the
values obtained from the previous two steps.
- Perform transform(P,R).
- continue
The algorithm for the operation transform(P,R) is as
follows:
transform(P,R)
1) Set
 #"$ 

 

i from 1 to k-1.
2) Set
 "$ &%
 .
For the transfer of the next data, the following is
done. The sender knows the number of parts of the
previous data and hence knows the value of N % k,
where % denotes the ’modulo’ operation. Now, this value
subtracted from k provides the    s unused in the last
run of the loop in the algorithm. The next data to be
transferred is first broken into parts as before. For the
first run of the loop in the algorithm, the first k-1-
(N%k) (here, this is the old value of N) parts are only
considered and the run executed. For the remaining runs,
we consider k-1 parts as before, and the algorithm is
continued. This is done for all subsequent data transfers
between the sender and the same receiver.
IV. AN ANALYSIS
A. Discussion
The essential idea in the algorithm is to split the
data into pieces of arbitrary size (rather, the size is
not arbitrary since it is bound by 0 and PS-2 but is
allowed to take any value between the limits), transmit
the pieces securely, and provide a mechanism to unite
the pieces at the receiver’s end. Towards this, the role of
the number P is to provide a structure for the creation of
the ”jigsaw” puzzle. This structure masks the pieces as
well as protects the data within. The structure is changed
periodically with the knowledge of both the sender and
the receiver to prevent an adversary gaining information
about it.
The  function is reversible and can be easily per-
formed by the receiver since he knows the secret number
P. However, an adversary without knowing P cannot
obtain any additional information. This is because of the
following.
Given a ciphertext C of length PS, and a random secret
key P of length PS, the probability of any particular key
is the same. If it is possible to guess the message M such
that C = M  P, then it is possible to determine the value
of P. Since every secret key P is equally likely, there
is no way of guessing which of the possible messages
of length PS or less was sent. In other words, let us
assume that the adversary has as much knowledge of the
cryptographic mechanism as the receiver does (except, of
course, knowledge of the secret key P). Now, the only
knowledge that an adversary has about both M and P
is that one is a binary string of length PS while the
other is of length less than PS. Then, knowledge of the
ciphertext C does not provide the adversary with any
more information pertaining to either M or P. This is
the information-theoretic security property of a one-time
pad (for more details, refer [2]). ! The value
'ff
 obeys
this one-time pad property since both
 
and
(
are
random numbers as far as the adversary is concerned.
Thus, it is impossible for an adversary to get any more
information given this value. Thus, all of
)
remain
completely unknown to the adversary.
Now, after k parts are processed, it is not possible to
repeat the values
 * 
	
	
	
. Else, by manipulations due
to the reversible nature of  , some information might be
leaked to the adversary. Therefore, the next set of values
have to be changed, and towards this a random number
of equal size is used. Also, this random number is to be
conveyed to the receiver without any adversary knowing
its value. Hence, we introduce the random number as
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the kth part. This random number is used to calculate
the next P to be used. Since the initial P was a secret
for the adversary, and so is the random number, the new
value of P is also a secret. Thus, the security of the data
transmission is ensured. In our model of the one-time
pad, data is of effective size less than (k-1)*PS bits and
the key ’xor’ed with the data at each stage is the number
 + 	
	
	 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. The random number R is used as an input
to a function (namely tran! sform()) to generate the key
for the next run. The value
 
is used to securely convey
the random number R, that is generated by the sender,
to the receiver.
The need for prefixing and suffixing every part with
the bit ’1’ is explained below. By ’xor’ing a part with
a random (with respect to the adversary) key of size
PS, we are effectively embedding the data in some place
in the key. However, there is a problem of the receiver
not knowing where the data is embedded. This is best
illustrated with an hypothetical example. Suppose the
part is the binary sequence 01101, and the key is the
sequence 11000110 where PS=8. Now embedding the
data at position 3 from the left in the key, we get
the value as 11011000. When the receiver performs the
’xor’ of this value with the key, the value he obtains is
00011010. Now, there is no way of knowing whether
the leading or the trailing zeros are part of the data or
not. This is the reason for the use of the single bit ’1’ to
prefix and suffix each part. As an illustration of this, we
continue with the same example. Note that the part is
necessarily smaller than the key by at least 2. Here the
part under question is affixed and prefixed by ’1’, and
then embedded in the key at position 2, say (position 3
can no longer be used). In this case, the resultant value
is 10011101. On performing the ’xor’ with the key, the
receiver obtains the value 01011011. From this value, he
considers only the binary sequence sandwiched between
the first and last occurrences of the bit ’1’ which is the
intended part.
A point of worry is that the arbitrary “tearing” of
data might result in a huge expansion of data. That is,
due to the randomness in the splitting, the amount of
data sent to convey some fixed amount of information
might be huge. To avoid this, the algorithm provides the
flexibility to fix a lower limit on the size a part can take.
This ensures that a minimum amount of information
is transferred to the receiver by each part. Thus, the
overheads in the algorithm can be suitably controlled
by the lower-limit size. It has been proved by Shannon
in [2] that in a one-time pad, as long as the data is
of a size lesser than or equal to the key used, then
Fig. 1. Comparison based on XORs alone
the perfect-secrecy property is maintained. This justifies
the statements made in this paragraph. In fact, for least
overhead, each part could be made of size PS (in this
case, there is no need to prefix and suffix with bit
’1’). Our algorithm is however a general case of this,
providing more security to lessen the probability of a
serendipitically successful attack.
The security offered by the algorithm is the same as
that provided by one-time pad - information-theoretic
security. This is evident from the fact that the jigsaw
is structured by an embedding of the data in the key
using the ’xor’ operation. However, unlike the one-time
pad, keys used in our algorithm are not completely
uncorrelated since the next key is formed as a function
of the current key and a random value. Thus, under
conditions of information leakage, the security offered
by our approach fails while the one-time pad continues
to offer the same level of security to the unexposed data.
The nature of security under such conditions has not been
studied here.
For private-key message authentication purposes, an-
other secret key might be needed. However, since any
PS-size block of P cannot be guessed from its first use,
it is possible to use any of them or parts of it (in case
a smaller key is desired) for message authentication by
the calculation of MAC. This information is also to be
exchanged a priori along with the number P as well as the
value of k. For different sender-receiver pairs, different
secret numbers P are needed. It is necessary to take care
to see that this indeed is the case.
B. Implementation Issues
In our algorithm, for the transfer of N parts of data,
there are N additions performed. Apart from these oper-
ations, the value of P is changed ,- /. times. At each
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Fig. 2. Change in number of XORs with k
change, there are k-1 additions and 1 multiplication.
Hence, in total our algorithm requires 0213,-  .
%46587
9
additions and ,
-  . multiplications on PS-bit blocks for
the transfer of N parts of data. There is a degree
of uncertainty involved in the amount of information
transferred in a part as the splits happen arbitrarily.
This uncertainty can, however, be removed marginally
by imposing a lower limit on the size a part can take
thus ensuring a transfer of minimum information in each
part. Let the value of k=7. To transfer data of size 10*PS,
assuming the best case of PS- size parts, we have N=10,
and therefore we effectively require 16*PS bit additions
and 1 PS-bit multiplication. In the worst case, assuming
the lower limit ! on size of each part to be :<; , we
require 20 parts to transfer the same amount of data
in which case we would effectively require 32*PS bit
additions and 2 PS-bit multiplications. A graph of the
best case(corresponding to each part being of maximum
size = PS) and the worst case (corresponding to each
part being of minimum size = :<; ) in the number of
additions versus data size is shown in figure 1. Figure 2
depicts the plot of the number of additions in the best
and worst cases as a function of the value k (assuming
N=10). Figure 3 plots the number of multiplications as
a function of k (again assuming N=10). It is important
to note that as k increases, the size of P also increases.
Therefore, an optimum value of k should be arrived at
by analysing these graphs and statistics.
A comparison with other encryption algorithms is
valid only when the application of those algorithms is
for secure data transmission. From this viewpoint, the
statistics presented above compare favourably with re-
spect to encryption algorithms like Advanced Encryption
Standard(AES) [11]. In AES, for input block size of
128-bits and key length of 128-bits, there are atleast
Fig. 3. Change in number of multiplications with k
11 ’xor’ operations apart from matrix multiplications,
table lookups and vector shifts. When AES is scaled to
an input of 10 PS-size blocks, it requires 110*PS bit
additions, far more operations than our algorithm func-
tioning in the worst case as can also be witnessed in the
figure 1 (we have not included the matrix multiplications,
table lookups and vector shifts in our calculations). Also,
our algorithm does not transform the data except for
the ’xor’ operation. This operation and its inverse can
be easily computed. Hence, as compared to encryption
algorithms like AES, DES ([12]) and RSA ([13]), the
data processing time is least for our algorithm.
Our algorithm lends itself to parallelism in implemen-
tation in software as well as dedicated hardware. The
execution of the operation transform(P,R) should follow
the processing of k blocks. This sequentiality cannot be
avoided. However, the processing of the blocks can be
done in a parallel manner. In principle, the algorithm can
be implemented efficiently using k ’xor’ gates, as shown
in figure 4. Here, the first three cycles of ’xor’s are de-
picted with the respective inputs and outputs. If number
of gates is also a constraint, for best performance, the
value of k should be decided accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we adopt a “jigsaw” approach to secure
data transfer in networks. The data to be sent is broken
into parts of arbitrary sizes. Enough information is
provided efficiently and securely to enable the receiver
to solve the “jigsaw” puzzle. The transfer of the parts
is done securely without leaking any information to
the adversary regarding the data. We have illustrated a
method of implementing message authentication by pri-
vate key without the exchange of any more information.
The concept of the one-time pad is implemented in the
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Fig. 4. Parallelism in algorithm (R’ denotes a new
random number)
course of the algorithm resulting in information-theoretic
security of data transfer. The issue of key management
is addressed by firstly the exchange of a large number a
priori, and then subsequent modifications to the large
number at regular intervals. These modifications are
designed such that their outputs seem random to the
adversary. Also, flexibility in the form of a means of
control is provided in the algorithm to monitor and check
the overhead resulting because of the data expansion due
to the arbitrary splitting.
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